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Youth justice pathways to change: Drivers, challenges and 
opportunities 
 
How and why does youth justice change? What is the nature of this change – constructive, 
regressive, real, rhetorical? Furthermore, what is the focus of this change – systemic, structural, 
political, philosophical, practical? This paper examines the pathways by which change is 
affected in youth justice, the mechanisms and processes operating along these pathways and 
the central challenges to understanding and implementing real change. We begin with the 
premise that change has been a constant in United Kingdom (UK) youth justice since the 
earliest differentiated responses to children who offend (see Case 2018), yet the extent and 
nature of this change has been complex, contingent and contested; oscillating between the 
aspirational, rhetorical and actual. Moreover, the pathways through which change has been 
achieved in the youth justice field have been opaque and beset by conflict and ambivalence 
regarding how to understand and treat children who offend. Throughout its trajectories of 
change, youth justice has, paradoxically, retained and supported a considerable stability in its 
organisation and approach and in terms of the outcomes experienced by children1. Stability has 
been the product of political, economic and academic investment in particular understandings 
of and responses to offending by children, which have been by-products and causes of 
entrenchment and resistance to change on the part of key stakeholders. The resulting inertia, 
protectionism and revolution (i.e. repeating and relying on past constructions of youth justice) 
has exacerbated conflict and ambivalence in the youth justice arena, whilst ‘change’ has tended 
towards the rhetorical and stochastic in nature - more apparent than real (McAra 2017). 
Furthermore, the assumptions of linearity that are redolent in historical narratives of change 
serve to over-simplify and even invalidate understandings of pathways. Where real change can 
be discerned, the pathways towards it are rarely linear and predictable and the influences on 
change are rarely simplistic or directly causal. Pathways are often catalysed by political 
responses to public debates, rather than effective youth justice practice, and thus characterised 
by zig-zagging policy changes. This has resulted in pathways which are at times chaotic, 
unpredictable, complex and multi-faceted in nature, with a progressively unfocused and 
confused model-base, as will become evident.  
                                                          
1 Following the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child definition of a ‘child’ as anyone aged up 
to 18-years-old (UNCRC 1989; see also Haines and Case 2015). 
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This paper examines pathways to change in youth justice - a broad arena populated by the 
systems, structures, policies, strategies, philosophies and practices that address offending by 
children (see Case 2018). Our primary focus will be the raft of sweeping changes experienced 
in the contemporary context of youth justice post-Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in England and 
Wales, with preceding changes explored selectively and where appropriate. Pursuing a 
comprehensive, definitive and internationally-informed history of change in youth justice is 
beyond the scope and focus of a stand-alone journal paper. The sheer breadth, complexity and 
longevity of youth justice preclude this. Whilst this enforced restriction leaves our arguments 
open to criticism, this paper is intended to test a number of assumptions and to open up an 
evolving debate regarding the nature of change in youth justice (including the implications for 
international jurisdictions) and how it can be constructed, understood and influenced. 
Accordingly, we explore the mechanisms, processes and key stakeholders driving and shaping 
change in contemporary youth justice, the challenges experienced along trajectories of change 
and the opportunities for enhancing youth justice presented by developing a better 
understanding of how change occurs. We apply an eco-systemic, critical analytical framework 
to identify and explore a series of macro-level (e.g. structural, philosophical, political), meso-
level (e.g. organisational cultures and inter-relationships) and micro-level (e.g. practitioner-
child relationships, practitioner discretion) influences upon policy change in contemporary 
youth justice in England and Wales. By analysing youth justice change as situated within 
processes that occur along complex and multi-faceted pathways, rather than as necessarily 
triggered by measurable causes acting in linear ways, we can develop ‘a firm understanding of 
where we are, how we got there and where we want to go next’ (Brett 2018: 36). This will 
enable an exploration of how contemporary youth justice might navigate its uncertain, 
unpredictable journey from this point forward, should we choose to learn the lessons of the 
past. Our analytical framework is constituted by a series of identified potential pathways to 
change that are distinct, yet mutually-reciprocal: political, paradigmatic, research-led and 
cognisant. 
 
The nature of youth justice can be understood as shaped by dominant paradigms or models at 
any given point in time (see Case 2018). A ‘model’ of youth justice is a framework for u 
rationalising responses to it through guiding theories, principles and strategies that are 
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operationalised and implemented through formal structures, processes and practices. No 
paradigm or model for understanding and responding to offending by children has yet been 
fully articulated by youth justice structures, strategies and processes. Instead, the nature of 
youth justice and its animation within bespoke ‘systems’ has been marked by conflict and 
ambivalence (Shore 2011) – thorough-going confusion, complexity and ultimately hybridity in 
preferred rationale, organisation and approach. The extent and nature of youth justice change, 
compared to its stability across historical periods, therefore, is both moot and ambiguous. One 
constant, however, has been a significant role of possibly the central driver of change in youth 
justice - the political sphere.  
 
1. Political pathways 
Youth justice has been a political points winner since the earliest differentiation of children 
from adults when they offend. Since the mid-19th century, arguably from the late 18th century 
(see Shore 2011), successive UK governments have pursued reforms, often sweeping in nature, 
of youth justice structures, strategies, paradigms and practices. Related change has been 
pursued through political rhetoric, legislation and processes of monitoring/control balanced 
uneasily with support/guidance. The overarching aim of these reform/change activities has 
been variously economic, socio-cultural, principled, research-informed and pragmatic - but 
always political. Incumbent UK governments have exploited youth justice to cement their 
identity as proactive change-makers, implicitly and explicitly accusing predecessors (even 
from their own political party) of inertia and/or failure to enact change. The relentless push for 
change has even disregarded legacies of measurable ‘success’ in the Youth Justice System 
(YJS), such as the dramatic falls in first-time entrants in the 1980s and 2007-16 decades, both 
of which were strongly associated with increased diversion practice and precipitated 
unconstructive, counterintuitive responses – punitive criminalisation (1990s) and an urgent 
review of the YJS (Taylor 2016) by the new Conservative Government.  
 
New governments commonly seek change in youth justice through ‘stochastic features of 
statecraft’ (McAra 2017) - differentiation from the past, re/constructing the youth justice 
architecture (e.g. structures), nurturing new audiences and introducing greater complexity into 
policy discourse. The pathways to this change are often  ‘stochastic’ (often more rhetorical and 
apparent than real), typically pursued (at least in part) to fulfil political agendas, rather than 
implemented for tangible, beneficial, evidence-based or otherwise defensible reasons 
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(Bateman 2017), thereby becoming obstacles to real change. A cogent example of political 
influence through ‘statecraft’ was the 1990’s punitive turn by the Conservative Government - 
a turn away from diversion and minimum necessary intervention approaches (which proved 
practically and financially effective during the 1980s) and towards expensive and ineffective 
custody and formal intervention to appear tough on crime to the voting public (Muncie 2014). 
This represented a regressive step back to harmful and ineffective punitive youth justice 
paradigms of the past; a retrenchment from the progressive practices of the 1980s. The punitive 
turn, therefore, embodied stability (not change) in youth justice through stasis (not dynamism) 
and regression (not progression). 
 
 
Political influence in focus: The ‘dynamic’ minimum age of criminal responsibility  
 
A powerful historical illustration of stochastic ‘change’ (not to mention stalling and general 
inertia) in youth justice is provided by variations to the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility (MACR) in England and Wales. The 1933 Children and Young Persons Act 
raised the MACR from 7 to 8 years of age, and the 1963 Act then raised it again to 10. The 
1969 Act made provision for the MACR to be increased to 14, but since its enactment 
coincided with a change of government, this was never actually realised. Furthermore, the 
provision of the presumption of doli incapax for children under 14 (meaning that the 
prosecution had to prove children’s understanding of the criminality of their behaviour, 
rather than mere naughtiness) was swept away in the 1990s’ ‘punitive turn’ and formally 
abolished by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which meant an effective lowering of the 
MACR.  
 
There have been various calls for the MACR to be increased over the years, with the latest 
Private Members Bill coming from Lord Dholakia – his third attempt at raising it to 12-
years-old. England and Wales have remained stagnant with a MACR of 10-years-old for 
well over 50 years, against intense United Nations criticism of any sub-12-year old MACR, 
citing the Beijing Rules (minimum standards on youth justice), asserting that children under 
12 lack the emotional, mental and intellectual maturity to be truly responsible for offending 
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(McGuinness 2016). Notwithstanding this, currently the Government’s position (similar to 
preceding governments of all colours) is that they have no plans to revise the MACR. 
 
If political ‘changes’ prior to the Crime and Disorder Act 19982 steadily built towards the 
construction of a differential youth justice sector, albeit prevaricating between welfare-justice 
and all constructions of youth justice in between, developments since have done little more 
than tweak what is already in place and to encompass changing policies, government targets, 
and developing research understanding (not much of which has been complementary). These 
processes fit along a pathway to change characterised by superficiality (e.g. lazy assumptions 
of linearity), lack of criticality and over-riding pragmatism and politicisation – all obstacles to 
genuine progress. Subsequent changes to youth justice architecture have been more akin to a 
stochastic rearranging of the furniture (McAra 2017) through unreflective tinkering and bolting 
on. There has been a somewhat dogged adherence to the Risk Factor Prevention Paradigm 
(RFPP – see paradigmatic pathways section) as the main underlying model-base for the YJS, 
with any changes needing to fit within it to some degree – amounting to minor changes along 
a largely-stable policy trajectory. Such policy and practice commitment, particularly in the face 
of an incrementally critical evidence-base, suggests a degree of entrenchment; political, 
financial, practical and emotional investment in a pragmatic paradigm fitting a political agenda 
for managerialism, responsibilisation and neo-correctionalism (Case and Haines 2015).  
 
Substantial change was discernible, however, through the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 2012. The LASPO Act reversed the tariff-based 
sentencing escalator of the Crime and Disorder Act, allowing once again for the cautioning of 
children, without ever-increasing levels of disposal (for example, a child who had previously 
served a prison sentence could be cautioned for a further, less serious, offence). After a decade 
of increasing system-activity towards children who offend, at last (and in response to research 
highlighting the damage of system-contact for children), it was acknowledged that more was 
not necessarily better. This led to reduced funding for the youth justice sector, justified by the 
falling numbers, and the notion that since the work of statutory, multi-agency Youth Offending 
Teams (YOTs) work was declining, the whole system could contract. The pathway to change 
                                                          
2 Following the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, a formal' Youth Justice System' (YJS) was created for England and 
Wales, rather than for the whole of the UK - as youth justice legislative and policy responsibilities had been 
devolved to the new governments of Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
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here, occurring at a time of austerity could (as in the 1980s) be being driven purely by 
economics, albeit dressed up as addressing research concerns. However, whether incidental or 
deliberate, this sector reduction allowed children to escape the damaging clutches of the YJS 
thereby becoming an opportunity for beneficial change. 
 
As identified, a recurrent theme in trajectory of youth justice is that successive governments 
cannot leave it alone. Accordingly, the new Conservative Government (2015) commissioned a 
review (likely austerity-driven) of an ostensibly successful system. This could potentially have 
revolutionised the whole sector, allowing for a (near) complete re-assessment, rather than 
tinkering at the edges of the existent system. While Charlie Taylor’s (2016) resultant report 
offered interesting recommendations for change (e.g. paradigmatic shift to children first and 
education-focused responses, changing custody provision into smaller ‘secure schools’, 
abolishing the Youth Justice Board (YJB)), it stopped short of being particularly progressive 
(in, for example, specifically excluding a review of the MACR). However, by the time the 
report was published, Government personnel and priorities had changed, motivating a 
piecemeal acceptance of some recommendations, and complete rejection of others, notably the 
proposed abolition of the YJB (MoJ 2016). Still the basic structures of the YJS remained. 
 
The drivers of change in youth justice have been largely political, due to the tendency for youth 
crime as a social issue/problem to be a vote-winner (or loser). However, this has often resulted 
in stochastic changes that never really challenge underlying model bases or offer real change. 
This politically-driven policy change has been compounded by a YJB with an uncertain path 
or future. The opportunities here have begun, however, with the LASPO Act making changes 
radical enough to significantly impact numbers of children drawn into, and remaining within, 
the YJS, whilst also increasing the prominence of diversionary programmes to maintain this 
beneficial decrease through the reintroduction of cautions for children. While this could be a 
numbers game with youth justice figures, it also provides real opportunities to ensure that 
children are shielded from damaging contact with a damaging system (see McAra and McVie 
2007).  
 
2. Paradigmatic pathways 
The current youth justice ‘system’ has been in place in some form for the entirety of the 21st 
century, but various governments have attempted to tweak it to fit either their different agendas 
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or newer thinking, without really questioning or necessarily understanding the very 
underpinning paradigm or conceptual ‘model’ upon which it has been built. This conceptual 
framework at different points in history, has exerted significant influence upon how the YJS 
has developed since its progressive inception. The treatment of children who offend has 
undergone many metamorphoses through the centuries. Socio-historical constructions of youth 
justice have oscillated between strategies such as punitiveness (e.g. custody), reform, justice 
(e.g. just deserts, proportionality), welfare, education, restoration, minimum-
intervention/diversion and risk prevention to varying degrees at different points in time - often 
within complex and hybrid ‘mixed economy’ models (paradigms) that have been given 
expression by bespoke structures and processes (cf. Case 2018). As such, the evolution of youth 
justice is characterised as beset by recurring tensions, often embodying the conflict and 
ambivalence that still feature in 21st century youth justice debates. Successive government 
legislation has created a patchwork quilt system, with no discernible, coherent paradigm, 
philosophy or set of consolidating principles (see Muncie 2008), despite broad-brush 
caricatures framing historical youth justice developments within the perennial ‘welfare versus 
justice debate’ (Smith 2005). Indeed, by the 1990s, the welfare and justice elements of youth 
justice that had allegedly shaped its historical paradigmatic trajectory were being heavily 
criticised, with welfarism caricatured as laissez-fairer, justice as ineffectual (Smith 2005). The 
YJS was lambasted as ineffective and inefficient in the Audit Commission’s (1996) report 
‘Misspent Youth’, which privileged contemporary risk-based models of assessment and 
addressment, most notably the RFPP (RFPP; Hawkins and Catalano 1992).  
 
The RFPP embodied a paradigm shift for youth justice – no longer privileging welfare or 
justice, but rather a risk-led, neo-liberal neo-correctionalism (Hazel 2008). This was embraced 
by the ‘New Labour’ Government of 1997, which legislated the espoused ‘evidence-based’ 
risk approach into systems of assessment and (early) intervention through the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, thus animating their punitive, interventionist and vote-winning mantra 
‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’. The fit between paradigm and political agenda 
is palpable here. The RFPP was an ideal vehicle through which to pursue a ‘new youth justice’ 
(Goldson 2000) of neo-liberal responsibilisation, interventionism and managerialism, all 
couched in the language of ‘evidence-based’ policy. However, here the paradigmatic 
constructive influence constituted more of a post-hoc justification of pre-formed policy 
direction - more policy-based evidence than evidence-based policy. The RFPP was an idea 
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whose time had come (Case and Haines 2009), providing as it did a reliable (consistent) 
evidence-base to rationalise policy change. The government’s lack of criticality and awareness 
regarding the robustness, completeness and appropriateness of applying this evidence-base 
since 1998 has been a constant bone of contention (cf. Goldson and Hughes 2010). Indeed, the 
RFPP has been subject to widespread evidential, methodological and ethical critique for two 
decades now due to its partiality (bias and incompleteness), self-replicating/fulfilling evidence-
base, invalid, presumptive and overstated conclusions and its negative impact on 
understandings of children when they offend (Case and Haines 2015, 2009).  
 
Thereafter, this ‘new youth justice’ system in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which carried 
with it unchallenged the ghosts of previous debates and controversies, became its own huge 
centralised, managerial universe – with managerialism functioning as the strategic vehicle 
through which to mobilise the RFPP and its associated agenda of responsibilisation. Multi-
agency YOTs were created to deliver court-ordered face-to-face work to children, after 
assessment of their ‘criminogenic needs’ (risk factors framed as the ‘causes’ of crime), which 
were overseen by the centralised YJB. Discretion for responses to ‘youth offending' was 
discarded in favour of an interventionist, criminalising tariff/escalator, bringing children far 
more inevitably to court, with severely limited pre-court options. The result was an explosion 
of numbers at all stages of the process, from first-time-entrants to those being given custody. 
Interventions were seen as essential to help children address the reasons for their offending, 
conceptualised as largely within the individual or their immediate context (ultra-positivism). 
External issues increasing the ‘risk’ of offending (like poverty) were acknowledged, but 
unchallenged by the response, despite multi-agency teams capable of addressing wider more 
structural elements of risk, including health, education, and family- based issues. The potential 
for addressing these was largely missed by the individual focus of risk-led YOT practice, but 
potentially points the way for a more constructive development. 
 
The paradigmatic drivers of youth justice policy development can be seen as largely political 
in nature, reacting to public concerns, and contributing to the punitive turn of the 1990s, 
justified through reference to outdated and questionable literature. The culmination for 
contemporary youth justice – a paradigm shift towards risk as dominant – saw a move away 
from the welfare-justice debate, creating a system which is neither protective nor just for the 
children it subsumes. The challenge from this is how the YJS can move into the new world of 
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the twenty-first century, with its changing perceptions of ‘youth’ and attempts both to reframe 
the hegemonic risk-led evidence-base and to foster new research frontiers to develop different 
evidence with which to inform policy and practice. 
 
3. Research-led pathways  
The influence of empirical research and academic scholarship on the nature of youth justice, 
often through interactions with political and paradigmatic pathways, has waxed and waned 
historically. Academia has played a role in shaping political definitions (constructions) and 
explanations (theories) of offending by children, including contributing empirical and scholarly 
evidence to the pivotal constructions of ‘child’, ‘youth’ and ‘offending’ (Case 2018). 
Academics and researchers have also contributed to debates around appropriate and effective 
responses to offending behaviour (i.e. ‘youth justice’). However, reflective of academia itself, 
a large degree of subjectivity and partiality has guided government and its agents (e.g. YJB) in 
their prioritisation of particular definitions, explanations and responses over alternatives. 
Political acceptance of, and resistance to, the academy has fluctuated widely, often dependent 
upon political expediency. Examples of governmental conflict and ambivalence regarding 
academia are abundant. They include the early 20th century political embracing of Hall’s (1904) 
construction of ‘adolescence’ that reconciled the innocent child-dangerous offender paradox 
(Case 2018), the 1980s ‘successful revolution’ towards diversionary practice (Allen 1991), the 
1990s punitive turn that contradicted the existing (academic and empirical) effective practice 
evidence-base (Bateman 2017) and the ‘new youth justice’ reconstruction of the entire YJS 
around the empirically-hegemonic RFPP (Hampson 2018). The overriding implication is that 
research-led (academic, scholarly) influence populates pathways to change in youth justice 
largely when it suits political agenda in response to specific socio-political/cultural/economic 
contexts and changes - the selective integration of political expedience with research evidence 
(Smith 2014). This again implies a political driver, rather than research evidence - leading to 
policy-based evidence over evidence-based policy. The development of the YJS as 
underpinned by the RFPP is a good example, as the model-base itself has become an obstacle 
to progress towards practice likely to reduce children’s offending.  
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The RFPP as an obstacle to policy and practice change 
The RFPP rose to prominence as a significant influence on youth justice in England and 
Wales on the back of a burgeoning emphasis on cogent evidence-base, most notably, 
evidence from the longitudinal, multi-method Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development 
(the ‘Cambridge Study’ - West and Farrington 1973; Farrington 2007). Over nearly 60 years, 
the researchers repeatedly identified psychosocial risk factors in childhood and adolescence 
(in family, school, neighbourhood, peer and individual domains of life) that statistically 
predict later offending and associated aspects of a ‘criminal career’ (e.g. onset, persistence, 
escalation). These risk factors have been the cornerstone of risk assessment and intervention 
processes that have shaped YJS policy and practice since 1998.  
 
The replicability of this risk factor evidence-base across the Cambridge Study, and the 
wealth of research studies that it has influenced, has been a key rationale for embedding its 
findings within youth justice processes. However, replicability, possibly suffering from 
confirmation bias, has been privileged to the neglect of the clear weaknesses and limitations 
in the study. The Cambridge Study has produced findings that when applied to contemporary 
youth justice can be considered to be: androcentric (focused only on young males), class-
centric (focused only on the working class) and urban-centric (generated without accessing 
rural samples); not to mention out-dated (generated in the 1960s and applied uncritically 
over 50 years later) and demonstrating psychosocial bias (e.g. not considering socio-
structural or situational influences) - thus rendering these findings of limited ecological 
validity, generalisability and transferability/applicability. Dogged and uncritical 
governmental adherence to the RFPP justified by the Cambridge Study is indicative of an 
entrenched bias-driving policy agenda fuelled by policy-based evidence-approaches 
promoting inertia. 
 
Notwithstanding the dominance of the RFPP-led thinking and practice in youth justice, 
however, academia could offer a different pathway to change. Contemporary criminological 
research has prioritised eliciting the voices of children who offend to investigate how they 
experience, construct and negotiate ‘risk’ in qualitative, personally-meaningful ways (cf. the 
Edinburgh Study - McAra and McVie 2015, 2007; the Teesside Studies - MacDonald 2007; 
the ESRC Pathways projects - France and Homel 2007). Evidence-based constructivist 
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understandings of how children negotiate and resist ‘pathways” into and out of offending have 
subsequently influenced children first policy formations in Wales (e.g. the ‘Children and 
Young People First’ youth justice strategy - Welsh Government and YJB 2014) and the nascent 
‘Participation Strategy’ of the YJB for England and Wales (YJB 2016). 
  
Associated research has begun to incorporate desistance thinking into youth justice work, 
shifting the focus from factors allegedly leading to offending (risk factors), onto reasons for its 
cessation. A major current desistance focus is on pathways to changing personal narratives, 
away from self-identifying as an offender, and towards identifying as a non-offender. There is 
an inherent difficulty in applying extant desistance research, which is largely adult-centric, 
directly to youth justice, since children are not considered to have a hardened criminal identity, 
seeming to ‘drift’ in and out of crime, without commitment to it (Matza, 1964). However, there 
is now an emerging literature-base of complementary research looking at applications for 
children (see for example Barry 2006; Johns et al., 2016). Therefore, a slightly different 
understanding has been adopted; one focused on maturity as facilitating desistance (Rocque 
2015). For years, children who commit crime infrequently, or seriously, have been treated as 
criminals within a criminal system. However, the pathway to change is an academically-driven, 
conceptual/paradigmatic shift from the deficit-focused risk agenda towards more promotional, 
strengths-based approaches, so the time is ripe for a different approach.   
 
The incremental development of youth justice-based research brings with it opportunities to 
address the challenges to progression and evolution should the political will emerge. A lack of 
evidence-based, research-informed consensus around new concepts and approaches in youth 
justice (e.g. the participation and desistance agendas) is a key issue for academia and for policy 
and practice development. It can result in confused and contradictory messages to practitioners, 
children and the general public. Additionally, the power of academia to promote reform and 
change in youth justice through evidence generation can be mitigated by political expediency 
and professional experience (see Smith 2014), which may explain the somewhat piecemeal 
way in which strategic concepts such as ‘desistance’ are integrated into the existent YJS 
through practice and process. There are tentative signs of an emerging focus on bridging the 
academic-professional and integrating academic research understandings into the development 
of youth justice. Notably, the ‘Academic/YOT Partnership Working Guide’ (YJB 2017) 
encourages collaboration between the youth justice sector (n.b. YOTs, not the YJB itself) and 
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the academic/research community. The guide asserts that such partnerships will enable youth 
justice workers to access expert advice and training (from academics/researchers) and will 
provide academics with valuable access to youth justice data and staff – with the objective of 
developing effective practice. Two notable examples of these symbiotic partnerships are 
Greater Manchester Youth Justice University Partnership and Hwb Doeth in Wales. Greater 
Manchester Youth Justice University Partnership was established in 2014 and has set up a 
Knowledge Transfer Partnership between Manchester Metropolitan University and the Greater 
Manchester youth justice services. Hwb Doeth is somewhat newer, having begun in 2017, and 
was a development of the already existent Practice Development Panel of YJB Cymru. It now 
encompasses all universities and YOTs within Wales, so that mutually beneficial research can 
be facilitated, and practice developed as a result.  
 
These developments demonstrate that while historically there has been something of a gulf 
between those at the coal-face of youth justice practice and those seeking to research 
effectiveness in the field, resulting in delays in communication or even politically-expedient 
side-lining of new knowledge, the future seems able to promise more cross-pollination between 
research and practice, which could be a driver for policy and legislative change.   
 
4. Cognisant pathways  
A perennial, yet often unrecognised issue (a potential enabler and obstacle) to affecting change 
in youth justice is that of cognisance - knowledge, awareness and understanding of the 
paradigms/models, concepts, theories and tenets that drive the field. Cognisance is not 
necessarily consensual or equitable between key stakeholders in youth justice. Levels of 
cognisance can vary between and within the stakeholder organisations and local areas, 
influencing the validity (accuracy, comprehensiveness and appropriateness) of understandings 
of youth offending and youth justice and the transfer of policy into practice in linear and 
consistent ways. One obstacle to consistent and effective policy generation and implementation 
in practice is the unacknowledged and somewhat inevitable partiality (bias and 
incompleteness) in the cognisance of key stakeholders. Partiality influences and shapes 
everyday youth justice practice, manifested in organisational agendas and priorities. A key 
exemplar is the YJB itself, the strategic lead for youth justice work in England and Wales, and 
so the central hub for effective practice for YOTs. Arguably, the YJB retains a somewhat 
problematic and confused understanding of key youth justice concepts such as desistance, 
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prevention, and diversion – all still indelibly tainted by the risk agenda. This deficit-led, risk 
focus, which consolidates constructions of dangerous, troublesome children, has been used to 
justify continued support for punishment in sentencing guidelines, despite it original rationale 
being to inform preventative practice. The result has been mixed messages communicated to 
practitioners, exemplified by a disconnect between the rationale for youth justice approaches, 
hegemonic sentencing strategies and recommendations for working practices.  
 
At the paradigmatic/conceptual level, for example, there is deep-rooted confusion and 
misunderstanding regarding prevention, the central plank of youth justice policy and practice, 
and the primary aim of the YJS. Prevention is regularly conflated with related, yet distinct 
principles such as early intervention and diversion in youth justice policy and practice 
guidance. The prevention of offending is not synonymous with early intervention (typically 
operationalised as identifying and targeting measurable risks for offending); nor is it 
synonymous with diversion (redirecting children away from the formal YJS and into other 
services). Neither is the prevention of offending (for the first time) synonymous with the 
prevention of reoffending; nor does it necessarily share the same risk factors if this is to be the 
evidence-base relied upon. Furthermore, prevention (similarly early intervention and 
diversion) need not be risk-focused and/or targeted/individualised, but the YJB and 
government appear insistent that it should be. Even when targeted and individualised, 
prevention practice can focus on addressing children’s needs, wishes, rights, strengths and 
opportunities, rather than emphasising risk factors (Haines and Case 2015). Partiality towards 
risk-focused prevention artificially restricts the scope and ambition of pathways to change - 
wedding it to neo-correctionalist, retrospective and deficit-focused perspectives. Partiality 
towards the continued conflation of prevention, early intervention and diversion along 
pathways to change is indicative of both misunderstandings and neglect of their fundamental 
differences in philosophy and approach, which itself can artificially restrict practice when 
(mis)translated by youth justice staff.  
 
At the practice level, the YJB has sought to develop newer academic thinking in criminology 
around desistance within youth justice and to implement this within the AssetPlus assessment-
intervention process. However, they have not acknowledged the potentially poor fit for 
‘desistance’ with children, discussed earlier. Desistance work in youth justice might be better 
considered as promoting pro-social development, rather than facilitating children to completely 
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change direction (more associated with adult desistance). This means that the YJB has 
embedded ‘desistance’ within its parameters, rather than pro-social development, possibly 
indicating a lack of understanding both of desistance as a concept or process, and of adult-
centric research into this area. An attitude which considers children to be ‘mini-adults’ should 
have long been consigned to history, but appears to have been resurrected here, constituting an 
obstacle to the adoption of more relevant aspects.  
 
Another, possibly more devastating, issue is that although much of the desistance literature 
concentrates on the importance of working with strengths and facilitating personal identity shift 
towards the non-criminal, necessarily meaning a move away from risk-centric thinking (which 
results in negative offence-focused working), this appears to have been ignored in documents 
from both the YJB and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation (hereafter ‘the Inspectorate’). 
Indeed, the Inspectorate’s thematic inspection report formulated ‘desistance’ quite differently 
from the YJB, surely creating systemic confusion for practitioners in both cognisance and 
outworking of this into practice (Hampson 2018). Both institutions have made significant 
alterations to their expectations, as evidenced by the current assessment tool of AssetPlus for 
the YJB (2014), and the new inspection framework for the Inspectorate (2017), to incorporate 
desistance, but to which model should YOTs align themselves? Additionally, this has resulted 
in an uncomfortable mixture of model-base, since the RFPP still underpins YOT working (and 
Inspectorate inspections), but now with something of an additional desistance ‘bolt-on’. 
AssetPlus, in still being a risk assessment tool (risk of reoffending, risk of serious harm to 
others and risk of vulnerability) seems to ask practitioners to combine opposing models, 
resulting in an unhappy emulsion, potentially compromising the effectiveness of positive, 
strengths-based interventions. Any pathway to change in paradigmatic model-base towards a 
more positive strengths-based approach needs sound understanding of the research by those 
propounding the changes, and a purer application without the pollution of the previous risk 
approach.  
 
 
 
 
Desistance-focused assessment  
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There is some evidence through examinations of AssetPlus that positive work with children 
is now understood, welcomed and justified in intervention plans (cf. Hampson 2018). 
However there is a lack of emphasis on positive working which could facilitate pro-social 
development incidentally, for example taking quality time to build relationship between 
worker and child/young person. Although most workers acknowledge the importance of this, 
it is seen as a pre-cursor to the ‘more important work’ of reducing risk; evidenced by two of 
the five ‘key areas of intervention’ being negatively phrased; ‘not offending’ and ‘not hurting 
others’, invites specific interventions, rather than seeing pro-social development as 
addressing them more naturally. Consequently, managers still look for risk-reducing work 
(as defined by the RFPP) to be undertaken, dragging children back to offence-focused work, 
which does not allow them to see themselves differently. Practitioners have expressed this 
concern, that it has held them back from fully embracing positive-focused interventions. 
They have also voiced that courts expect such documents as Pre-Sentence Reports to address 
risk as a priority, which requires identifying offence-focused work as a major goal of any 
intervention. Until magistrates and judges understand such approaches, practitioners feel 
they will be hampered in their efforts to employ them (Hampson 2018). This demonstrates a 
much wider issue with cognisance than just the YJB and YOTs. 
 
Notwithstanding tinkering at the edges and stochastic statecraft as examples of change within 
youth justice, YOTs have had to make sense of much tangible change over the years since their 
inception, from varying YJB ‘Key Performance Indicators’, the introduction and subsequent 
changes to National Standards, the strictures of actuarial risk assessments and the move to a 
less risk-obsessed assessment framework. The earlier changes driven by the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 placed more structure around YOTs, progressively eroding practitioners’ 
skills and decision-making, whilst ‘prescribing’ cognisance to an extent - privileging partial 
governmental/YJB understandings of the central drivers of effective youth justice. Since the 
Scaled Approach (the peak of external interference), requirements have progressively reduced, 
leaving more responsibility for decision-making and the development of expert, nuanced 
understandings with practitioners themselves. This transition to more autonomy has been 
difficult, requiring practitioners to have more individual understanding, leaving many lacking 
confidence in their skills and ability to complete a somewhat less structured assessment 
(AssetPlus) (Hampson 2018). This offers great potential for practitioners to embed change into 
their practice, but without adequate training, is a difficult path to tread and threatens a 
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disconnect between policy and practice. Compounding this issue, YJB and the Inspectorate 
cognisance of desistance approaches appears variable and at odds, leading to confused 
messages being filtered down to managers and individual YOT workers. For example, the 
Inspectorate’s thematic inspection on desistance (2016) identified the building of positive 
empathic relationships as key, whereas this aspect of working was not even mentioned within 
the AssetPlus rationale document, or given house-room within the structure of that assessment 
(YJB 2014). This, when coupled with insufficient training (or ineffective training 
methodology), potentially turns an opportunity into an obstacle.  
 
Finally, the facility for practitioners to develop constructive relationships with children along 
pathways to practice change is also dependent on relationships further up the ladder. YOT 
workers are answerable to managers, who supervise their work and offer guidance for future 
development. If YOT managers are not fully cognisant of changes in policy, and the underlying 
models, then their expectations of workers could tend towards being risk-focused, as this is the 
only way prevention is perceived to be operational. In part this is fuelled by (confused and 
confusing) communications from the YJB, but also from the inspectorate, both agencies, 
having conflated desistance and risk into the same arena (mainly regarding AssetPlus). 
However, the ladder continues upwards, with both the YJB and inspectorate being answerable 
to government, and therefore aiming to service the priorities of whoever is in power (with all 
the resultant emphasis on vote-winning policies to reassure the public that the ‘problem’ of 
youth is being addressed). The filter which this gives governments in the interpretation of 
research provides for an uneasy relationship with academia, resulting in policies which only 
reflect findings sympathetic to their political cause.  
 
There appears to be little agreement or understanding within and between key structures and 
organisations of the YJS at all levels regarding how to understand and implement central 
concepts of youth justice such as prevention, diversion and desistance, which can translate into 
difficulties for practice. This lack of cognisance in key areas, including youth justice model-
base, has resulted in new developments, promising for future development, being promoted 
and rolled-out in inconsistent, partial and confused ways. Any disconnect in cognisance 
between key stakeholders could be addressed by developing closer working relationships to 
critically reflect upon the central tenets and driving concepts of youth justice. Although there 
is a tentative focus on this situation through the academic/partnership agenda (YJB 2017, there 
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appears little appetite from the YJB for England and Wales (as opposed to YJB Cymru) to 
work more closely with YOTs (beyond tokenistic and post-hoc ‘consultation’ exercises) or 
academics/researchers to critically interrogate and develop shared understandings of the 
essential premises of youth justice nationally. The future progression of youth justice policy 
understandings and their implementation in meaningful practice would seem to largely rely on 
the YJB modelling the work of YJB Cymru and key youth justice services in England (e.g. 
Surrey’s Youth Support Service – see Byrne and Case 2016, the Greater Manchester Youth 
Justice University Partnership – see Axon and Jones, in Case 2018) in terms of engagement 
with academic research/critical friends and engagement with its own mantra of effective 
practice development through evidence-based policy and critical reflection. 
 
Discussion: Pathways to change in youth justice 
It is apparent that the pathways to change in the systems, structures, strategies, policies, 
philosophies and practices of youth justice in England and Wales have been and remain non-
linear (even arbitrary), multiple, contested and multi-faceted. Pathways to change are 
constituted by a series of inter-related and dynamic influences that can be categorised as 
paradigmatic, political, research-led and cognisant. However, despite the ostensible dynamism 
of the youth justice policy field, related changes are not always real or substantial and can be 
stochastic and rhetorical - anchored to stability and manifested through tinkering and bolt-ons, 
themselves often the product of socio-political economic anxieties, investment, entrenchment 
and austerity. We assert that the pathways to real change in youth justice policy are fraught 
with difficulty, with many voices seeking to be heard in its current and future development. 
The Government (operating along political pathways) is ultimately the key driver for change, 
experienced through the centuries as an increasing need for children to be treated differently to 
adults, yet with disagreement on how that should look. We are inclined, therefore, to support 
Phoenix’s (2016: 124) observation of a fundamental rupture in the relationship ‘between how 
we deal with youth crime (i.e. the processes, procedures and provisions) and why we do it (i.e. 
any higher philosophical or ethical goals)’. Consequently, more attention should be paid to the 
paradigmatic and research-led pathways to change that inter-relate with and impact upon 
cognisant pathways to change, with a view to encouraging more reflectiveness and reflexivity 
in political pathways and the relationships between key stakeholders who interact across youth 
justice processes. Despite a necessary focus on the England and Wales context, adopting the 
pathways lens identifies lessons that are clearly transferable to other jurisdictions in terms of 
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how to examine the development of youth justice and how to understand the operation and 
complexities of the influences upon this development.    
 
Influencing government is always the pervasive, populist and punitive voice of the media, 
purporting to be the voice of the ordinary person in the street, which politicians ignore at their 
peril. Less influential, yet typically more balanced and better informed, has been the voice of 
the critical academic and empirical researcher operating along research-led pathways, 
particularly those outwith the developmentalist RFPP movement (functioning within 
paradigmatic pathways). Seemingly marginal to all of these influencers have been youth justice 
practitioners working at the coal face with children - who have been even less influential and 
often entirely unheard. Returning to our title, it could be argued that the drivers (including their 
related obstacles), challenges and opportunities operating along identified pathways to change 
in youth justice are essentially different sides of the same coin. The paradigmatic, political, 
research-led and cognisant drivers of change need to be mobilised in order to overcome 
obstacles to change (e.g. inertia, austerity, misunderstandings), to address the challenges of 
contemporary youth justice (e.g. doing the same or more with less) and to maximise 
opportunities for growth and progress (e.g. towards a children first system). 
 
It must be acknowledged that there are some promising green shoots of opportunity emerging 
within youth justice policy and practice development, assisted by research indicating the utility 
of diversion, minimal intervention and strengths-based, pro-social and positive practice. The 
incorporation of desistance approaches into YJB guidance and the AssetPlus framework, for 
example, coupled with a new, more positive, the Inspectorate’s inspection framework and 
emerging academic/YOT partnerships, shows a promising direction of travel. Some individual 
localities are evidently developing good practice in this area, which is to be commended and 
provides direction elsewhere, where progress has perhaps been slower. There appears to be an 
appetite for change amongst practitioners, who recognise the benefits of working positively 
with children (especially those who have been in the system long enough to remember pre- 
Crime and Disorder Act working), but who are not sufficiently confident to entirely cut the 
apron strings of the RFPP. Consequently, this is a potential driver for change, but wrapped up 
within an obstacle.  
 
Turning challenges into opportunities and recommendations 
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There are, therefore, significant challenges facing the sector if change is to be holistic, effective 
and permanent, rather than regressive or stochastic. Opportunity lies in identifying and 
clarifying the most appropriate model-base for youth justice without relying on research with 
adults or conflating models of risk and desistance. This then needs to be communicated 
effectively with youth justice practitioners and their managers, to provide sound understanding 
upon which to base their work and defend decisions. Such communication needs to go much 
further than the YOTs, so that the judiciary are also able to understand the model-base of 
reports. Another challenge is to encourage stakeholders across the system to appreciate the 
value of allowing children to participate in intervention decision-making. The role of the YJB 
seems pivotal in addressing the contemporary challenges faced by youth justice and embedding 
change within practice. More generally, policy and practice appear to be evolving towards the 
increasing integration of the youth justice agenda and its animating structures (e.g. YOTs) 
within wider children’s systems and services (see Taylor 2016). Therefore, a comprehensive 
and valid examination of change in youth justice should adopt a broader purview - analysing 
the multiple different institutions, organisations, practices, relationships and discourses 
involved in responding to children in trouble/need and the buried socio-political, economic, 
legal and evidential influences on their respective and combined abilities to affect change. 
 
Considered in the round, the contemporary youth justice context offers an open playing field 
for those seeking meaningful change. Socio-political economic uncertainties and anxieties 
conspire to produce and ‘ironic storm’, wherein ostensibly poor conditions for change actually 
present opportunities for significant change. This change can be driven by local innovation, 
organisational/practitioner discretion and closer working relationships between stakeholders 
(including children), rather than shaped by excessive managerialism, governance and 
prescriptions. Whether this change is necessarily centralised, formalised or supported 
financially is another question! There is an opportunity to really change policy focus away 
from a negative risk-led model, turning instead towards a strengths-based positive model that 
facilitates pro-social development and positive outcomes for children - thus attempting to heal 
the rupture between the how and the why of youth justice. This necessitates, however, viewing 
children who offend as children first, rather than focusing on their offending behaviour. 
Desistance literature indicates that concentrating on the positive is effective in reducing 
offending (at least for adults), so applying a ‘Children First, Offender Second’ (CFOS – Haines 
and Case 2015) model appeals. Currently, the potential for such change is seriously 
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compromised by clinging to facets of risk-thinking as the only way of reducing re/offending 
behaviour. This negative, retrospective, risk perspective is anathema to change and progress, 
but is also beginning to be rebuffed by growing research looking at children’s pro-social 
development, rather than thinking in terms of desisting from having a criminal identity (which 
does not typify children’s offending). Concurrently, the CFOS paradigm is beginning to 
pervade policy change, or at least, recommendations for policy change in England and Wales. 
The new Inspectorate inspection framework for YOTs (HMIP 2017) specifically assesses 
children’s participation in the whole youth justice process, including co-production of 
intervention plans. This ethos is starting to characterise strategic and policy responses in 
England and Wales, with direct reference to ‘children first’ principles in the national policing 
strategy for children (‘Child Centred Policing’ – NPCC 2015), sentencing guidelines for violent 
and sexual offenders (Sentencing Council 2015), national youth justice for Wales (‘Children 
and Young People First’ – YJB and Welsh Government 2014), recommendations for 
reorientation of the entire YJS (Taylor 2016) and proclamations from the YJB signifying 
wholesale strategic changes towards a ‘children first’ approach prioritising rights, strengths, 
engagement and diversion (YJB 2018: 7). 
 
What has become ‘clear’ across the piece is the lack of clarity regarding how change occurs in 
youth justice and the nature of this change. The mooted pathways to change are very probably 
inter-related and most definitely complex, nuanced, non-linear and subjective in nature. 
Notwithstanding this complexity, the multiple, inter-related and dynamic nature of these 
influences also presents an opportunity for key stakeholders working between and within 
different youth justice contexts and organisations; an opportunity to collaborate on an holistic 
and consensual agenda for change. We assert the need for policy, practice and perspective 
change in youth justice - a progressive and positive change (e.g. extending the ‘children first’ 
trajectory of change) in paradigmatic and political terms, a change that is simultaneously 
research-led, easier to communicate and understand (facilitating cognisance) and is 
foundational for robust relationships - all of which are significant influences along the 
pathways to change in youth justice. 
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